Going Nuclear in the Middle East - In search of an European Middle East Policy
Monique CERISIER-ben GUIGA, French Senator, Co-author of the Foreign Relations, Defence and Armed Forces Committee's Report on the Situation in the Middle East - The first round table discussion was very interesting. The question for us to ask now is : what is the future for the Palestinian people ?
Let me say just briefly that if you look at the current situation in 2010, we wonder if there is any other choice for the Palestinians than being either enclosed or exiled. By enclosed, I mean the blockade of Gaza or the enclaves that are getting ever smaller and ever more isolated in the West Bank. Since the punitive operation by Israel against Gaza, the situation in the occupied territories has worsened and become dramatic in every sense. I will give some figures. 2009 saw the arrest of 3,459 Palestinians, the destruction of 300 houses, the detention of 12,000 prisoners including compatriot Salah Hamouri, the loss of their statute as residents by 4,577 Palestinians from East Jerusalem. That is just as many as the entire period of previous occupation. All of this is to say that things are deteriorating for Palestinians.
Before giving the floor to our speakers, I would further specify that in the West Bank when there is protest, there is heavy repression. I would mention recent extrajudicial executions in areas of Palestinian sovereignty in Nablus after the assassination of a settler. I would also mention arrests of Abdallah Abu Rahmah, coordinator of the non-violent Bil'in movement, Jamal Juma, coordinator for Stop the Wall campaign as well as many other peaceful pacifists. The arrests have been denounced by an NGO in a recent report, Hamoked. I will also mention the administrative detention of several hundred Palestinians, two-thirds of whom have been in detention for over a year.
Probably even more serious, if we can talk about degrees of seriousness, it is very clear that the Israeli government's policy is targeting an «Israelization» of East Jerusalem. Arab inhabitants are being pushed out and their houses are being destroyed. Settlements continue in two continuous lines to completely cut off Jerusalem from surrounding Arab areas. This is particularly clear regarding Bethlehem. Bethlehem is a Christian city, which is seeing a real brain drain caused by Israeli politics. It is not by chance that Bethlehem has been encircled by settlements and cannot communicate with the surrounding environment. Lastly, a bill is being drafted to deprive the residency in Jerusalem of a large number of Palestinians who are fortunate to hold a nationality other than, so to speak, the «Palestinian» nationality, which does not exist because there is not a Palestinian state.
In Gaza, we are seeing the organisation of «halting in development». We are seing problems in agriculture and industry due to the bombings. The blockade continues to be made tougher. No rebuilding or reconstruction is possible to such an extent that the UNRWA has had to build clay houses as there is no cement to shelter refugees.
The question is what are our speakers going to say regarding this topic.
First of all, I would like to give the floor to Ms Muzna Shihabi. She is from the negotiation team of the Palestinian Authority. She will tell us how she views these issues as a Palestinian and a specialist in negotiations. Initially Ms Shihabi was a specialist in communications. That is what she studied. She has acquired a great deal of international experience, working at the UNDP and the WTO.
Secondly, and to some extent to answer her, I will be giving the floor to Mr Mike Singh, Researcher at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy after being top official at the NSC. He will be giving us the view of an American who is very familiar with negotiations. He will tell us how he sees the possibility for resumption in negotiations that would lead to some results and not to a negotiating process that would lead to nothing, which has been the case in the past 15 years.
Lastly, I will be asking Mr Henry Siegman, who has very original ideas as to how to overcome the problems. For 30 years, he has published over 100 articles in American journals and newspapers. His articles are always very striking. He is recognised as a specialist in Israeli-Arab relations, a specialist on the peace process and the US Jewish community. He will be able to give us his view.
Then Yves Aubin de la Messuzière will, to some extent, conclude by telling us how he sees things and how he considers this idea that we are hearing more and more about - this proclamation of a Palestinian state. Yves Aubin de la Messuzière is an Arab-speaking diplomat. He has been an Ambassador to Chad, Tunisia and Italy. He was the French representative to Iraq in the dark, bleak years of 1997 to 1999. He is a very active retiree, chairing the French Lay Mission and the Mission for the Museum of Civilisations in Europe and in the Mediterranean. By giving him the floor last, I think we will be closing our debate by hearing from someone who is very familiar with this region from the inside and he will be able to open us up to some interesting and original ideas as well.
Muzna SHIHABI - Member of the Palestinian Negotiation Team, Representing Saeb Erekat, Chief Palestinian Negotiator - Actually listening to the discussion about the Iranian regime just now, I found a lot of similarities with the Israeli regime. That seems strange but two things struck me: how the Iranians seem to elude negotiations just like the Israelis do, and how peaceful demonstrators are being arrested in the two countries. You might say the remedy is different and sanctions have not worked with Iran but maybe we should try as we have not tried yet with Israel.
To talk about the future of a Palestinian state you need to understand the Palestinian struggle. This struggle for a state, human rights and dignity is simply a just cause. It is a fight that is very similar to the combat against apartheid in South Africa or the anti-colonial movement in the previous century.
It is also important to understand the essence of this conflict. It is about rights and more specifically the rights that are refused to Palestinians living under occupation and also the rights refused to the seven million Palestinian refugees. According to our calculations, there are seven million. But the UN Agency for Refugees (UNRWA) registered only 4.5 million refugees.
The only obstacle to peace is Israel's refusal to comply with international law and the UN resolutions over past decades. To date the PLO has remained faithful to its national objectives aimed at putting an end to more than 40 years of occupation and 62 years of dispossession and exile. The objective is to create a sovereign, viable and independent Palestinian state on only 22 % of historical Palestine, that is to say the occupied territories from 1967, with East Jerusalem as the capital.
We still believe that negotiations are the only way to reach that objective. Now when we started negotiations in Madrid in 1991 and then signed the Oslo Accords in 1993, no one believed that it would be an easy process. It is true that we have not made any progress there and you could even say that we have moved back. However, we have learned a lot.
What are the challenges and the strategic choices facing us today in order to move forward with our national objectives ? What is the outlook for a fair and lasting peace? How should the Palestinian struggle develop and change?
The future of the Palestinian struggle, to a large extent, depends on the outcome of negotiations. Can these lead to fair and lasting peace? I think that, despite the extent of the challenge, it is not insurmountable.
It is important to understand that the peace process will not survive a further failure in negotiations. Palestinians today agree that the priority is not about restarting a negotiation process but restoring the credibility of that process. This is the position taken by Palestinian leadership. It is why a total settlement freeze is necessary before negotiations can resume.
If there is one lesson that we have learned over the last 16 years, it is that words do not replace actions. During negotiation, Israel produced one fait accompli after another and ignored international law and the related commitments in existing agreements. We heard the details and statistics from Ms Cerisier-ben Guiga, but worse again is that they have strengthened occupation, increased collective punishment against Palestinian people, and eroded the two-state solution. The erosion has been fuelled by the fact that the Israelis have refused to freeze settlements. The restrictions on the movement of goods and people have undermined the credibility of the peace process. There is another factor that has made the situation worse, which is keeping up the Gaza siege despite international pleas - even by the Quartet.
A credible peace process is in the interest of both peoples - Israeli and Palestinian. This process would mean that they would both have to face up to their commitments. The real litmus test of each party's commitment to peace is not what is said before, during, or after negotiations, but what actually happens on the ground. It is for this reason that the Palestinian leadership has, to date, remained firm in respect to its demand for a settlement freeze, including East Jerusalem.
This is not a precondition, as has been said. It is not a condition imposed by Palestinians. Neither is it a concession by the Israelis. It is an obligation on the «road map» signed in 2003 by Ariel Sharon's government. This paper does not talk about temporary or partial freezes. Israel must totally stop settlements and show that it is serious about negotiations if it it really wants a two-state solution both living side by side in peace.
Why is it vital to stop the settlements ? It is because they are the most serious threat to the two-state solution. These settlements use the lands and resources that would be necessary for a future Palestinian state.
I am going to discuss just a few statistics. During negotiations, before and during Annapolis, I will show you what happened with the settlements.
These are the calls for tender for housing units in the Israeli settlements. They are all illegal because they are on occupied territories. Before Annapolis, from December 2006 to November 2007, there were 137 calls for tender for housing units. During Annapolis itself, while there were negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians, there were 2,300 calls for tender. There were about 1,700 in East Jerusalem alone.
There were also building permits granted by the Israeli state to the settlers. Between January 2007 to November 2007, 704 permits were granted to the settlements. This is just in the West Bank, not East Jerusalem. During negotiations, it went up to 1,926.
If this is supposed to be a credible peace process, it was not for the Palestinians. While they were negotiating, settlements were being added. It is not just settlements; there were also closures. Before Annapolis, there were 563 physical obstacles in the way of people circulating in the West Bank. The number of physical barriers or obstacles increased after Annapolis. Unlike what you often hear in the media - namely that Israel has alleviated the suffering of the Palestinians and removed some checkpoints - I can assure you that while a few were removed immediately after being reported in the media that Israel had made efforts and so on, just a few days after that those checkpoints reappeared.
Everyone knows that the United States and the EU are able to influence Israel. Everyone knows that the attitude of the Obama administration will determine whether or not negotiations in the future fail or succeed, whether they act as an honest broker or not, and whether they create an environment that respects international law or not. It also depends on whether they recognise Palestinian fundamental rights and the injustice created by the occupation or not.
Israel has shown many times that it does not really intend to put an end to the occupation or to comply with international law of its own accord. Here I could tell you lots of stories. Firstly, recently, only a few days ago, we had a statement from Netanyahu, the Israeli Prime Minister. He clearly stated that he is going to increase Israeli military presence in the Jordan Valley, which represents 28.5% of the West Bank territory. It is an occupied territory lying at the frontier with Jordan and it is obviously very important for national resources. One wonders who wants peace and who really wants negotiation. In addition to what Ms Cerisier-ben Guiga said, there was the massacre of three Palestinians in Nablus: they were fathers who were sleeping and were killed in front of their wife and children. That was 26 December 2009. Moreover, 28 Palestinian families in Sheikh Jarrah in East Jerusalem will be evicted and be replaced by Jewish settlers. Four of them have already been evicted. There were many arrests of pacifists, even Israeli pacifists who came to support Palestinians, who simply organised demonstrations against the wall and the theft of land, as Ms Cerisier-ben Guiga said.
How can the Palestinian leadership come back to the negotiating table against such a background of people being evicted from their homes and murdered in their homes?
Only last week there were Palestinian Presidential Guards that were not in uniform but in plain clothes. They were going from Bethlehem to Ramallah. They were stopped and searched - and even stripped naked - at an Israeli checkpoint in view of all the passers-by.
These are just a few stories but I could tell you others.
It is why the Palestinian leadership says that it is necessary to define a specific framework for negotiations on the permanent status. We can no longer negotiate for the sake of it because negotiations are not an aim in themselves but a means of achieving a goal. What does this mean? We say we want productive negotiations that involve five factors. Firstly, negotiations must be restarted at the point where they stopped in Annapolis. Secondly, we must look at all of the underlying issues with no exception: Jerusalem, refugees, borders, water, removal of settlements and security. Thirdly, we must define in advance what is meant by the end game. That is to say an independent and sovereign Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as the capital of the 1967 territory in accordance with international law and Resolutions 242 and 238. Fourthly, we need a specific timeline for negotiations and the creation of a Palestinian state. We also need a method for tracking progress just to see who has or has not complied with their obligations. There has to be a verification mechanism to check and verify all actions as in the roadmap.
What is the role of the international community in all that ?
A failure to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not because nobody knows what a fair and lasting peace is or what measures are needed to get there. International law and the UN resolutions are clear. The roadmap and the Arab Peace Initiative are also clear. What is lacking is political will to end Israeli occupation and make it possible for Palestine to take its place among a community of nations.
Against this background the international community, particularly Europe, have a crucial role to play. Time has come to translate international consensus in favour of a viable independent sovereign Palestinian state into specific tangible progress that can give hope to the Palestinians. It is also the duty of the international community to produce the aforementioned verification mechanism so that it can be an impartial judge. There is a very wide range of measures possible: incentives, pressure and sanctions. The recommendations concerning Israeli action in East Jerusalem are well documented in the reports of the EU representative in Jerusalem dated November 23, 2009. It is very clear. I recommend you read it.
I could pick out a few examples of what the international community could do. An example is the closer linkage between Israel's compliance with international obligations, particularly the settlement freeze and the financial aid that it receives or the association agreement with the EU. Another example is prohibiting settlement products on national EU markets or at least making sure that those products do not get preferential commercial treatment. Also, those entities giving settlements the money could be refused charitable association status. Public investment, notably through pension funds, in favour of those companies involved in Israeli's colonial actions could also be stopped. European consulates in East Jerusalem should stop recognizing settlement addresses as being in Israel, for example, for visas.
International organizations can also play a role and it could be a Palestinian strategy when talking about their future. I believe that we should use bodies such as the International Criminal Court, the UN or the International Court of Justice much more often than we do at the moment. International law is not just the best solution in order to reach an end to conflict, it is also an alternative to violence. As stated in the Committee's report, Palestine is at the top of the Arab world's agenda so let us avoid giving extremists a pretext for using that to political ends.
Some of you probably remember the advisory opinion given in 2004 by the International Court of Justice saying that the wall built by Israel and the settlements are illegal. Unfortunately, this opinion did not prevent Israel from continuing to build the wall and its settlements. The international community, however, has not followed the court's recommendations. The problem is not the court but the impunity that encourages Israel to flout international law. We should try to change that climate rather than, as some of suggested, to think about a change to international law.
The Goldstone Report is very important as well. It accuses Israel of war crimes and crimes against humanity during its aggression against Gaza. The report comes down to one word: accountability. Israel must account for international law and international community. Crimes committed by Israel in Gaza must not remain unpunished. That includes the siege imposed by Israel, which is continuing today.
One option for Palestinians would be to request a second advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice disputing Israeli policies in occupied territories, especially with what is happening in East Jerusalem today and the Gaza siege. This is all a violation of international law. Such an option would mean a statement by the court on the illegality of all Israeli policies and their occupation. The legal consequences relating to such a statement could be considerable.
In conclusion then, maybe the time has come to forget negotiations. I do not think so, but they should not prevent us looking at alternative tactics away from negotiations if these can strengthen our negotiating position. The International Court of Justice is just one example. There are other options. The option that we do not have and that I think would go directly against Palestinian interest is violence. We are still waiting for the Israeli Prime minister who was said to agree with the minimal commitments of a fair and lasting peace. As I said, peace is possible. It must be based on international law. Israel has several options too, at least two. It can negotiate a fair and lasting peace based on a two-state solution or they can try to manage the status quo with a de facto apartheid state where Palestinians would demand the same rights and obligations as Israelis. It is up to Israel to decide. Thank you.
Mike SINGH, Ira Weiner Fellow, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy - Thank you very much Senator and thanks to all of you for being here today. I want to make an initial comment about the subject in general. I served for ten years as a US diplomat. Recently I was a Senior Director at the White House for the Middle East. My portfolio included all the countries from Morocco on one side to Iran on the other with the exception of Iraq, which was a separate bureaucracy under our administration.
I will say that I think we should be aware of caricatures of US policy under different presidents. I know there are strong feelings about both President Bush and President Obama here in Europe. However, my experience is that US policy under President Obama towards the Middle East is largely one of continuity with previous administrations and not just the previous administration but also the ones that came before. I think that Mr Malley alluded to this as well. That is because US policies largely reflect a consensus judgment of US interests, which do not fluctuate greatly from one administration to another. Of course, the tone, the atmosphere and the rhetoric all change considerably.
I think that we should also be careful when we are talking about an issue like the peace process and the Palestinian conflict to avoid solipsism and to avoid elevating our own role to an exaggerated degree. I think that frequently when we talk about this issue, we can overstate our own influence over events. We need to be a little bit more modest perhaps about what we can achieve. Especially since the US and France do not have an unqualified history of success in the Middle East, we should be modest and put our focus on the parties and what we can do to assist them in their efforts to achieve the peace that they both want.
I want to offer my observations from having participated in the negotiations from 2006 to 2008, including the Annapolis Conference and what preceded it and what followed. I also lived in Israel for two years and worked on the issue there as well.
The topic of our panel is: What is the future of the Palestinian people ? Obviously that is inseparable from the peace process, and that is what I am going to focus on. I would say that 2009, this past year, was a lost year for the peace process. That is not to say that nothing occurred on the ground or nothing occurred between the parties. By all means, many things did occur; quite a few negative and some positive. However generally this was a year of missed opportunities, I think. Perhaps this was inevitable. The President of the Palestinian Authority Mahmoud Abbas desired and still desires to resume negotiations where he left off with Ehud Olmert at the Annapolis Conference.
However, Olmert's successor Benjamin Netanyahu had no intention of doing that. He was deeply opposed to the types of concessions in the process which Olmert made and did not want to continue down that path. Given these circumstances, a head-on collision between the two men probably would have been difficult to avert under any circumstances.
Nevertheless, the events of the past year served to exacerbate the already significant divisions between these two leaders and their peoples. The fallout from the conflict in Gaza and the fracas over an Israeli settlement freeze particularly strained their relationships with each other and with the international community, to which previous speakers have already alluded.
I think that significant diplomatic efforts are now required to overcome these obstacles and heal the wounds that were sustained in 2009. However I would also say that even if these diplomatic efforts prove successful, the chances are small that the resumption of negotiations itself will lead to the resolution of the conflict.
As my colleagues have already mentioned, successive rounds of talks and focusing on core issues over the decades yielded little progress, with concessions offered by either side not doing much to move the other. Indeed with the passage of time, agreement has come to seem less rather than more likely. Israelis, while still seeing few viable alternatives to a two-state solution, are cynical about the value of a peace agreement, given the violence that followed the withdrawals from Gaza and Southern Lebanon. I think there is actually a chart in your report, which covers this quite nicely on page 50. It describes Israeli attitudes about, let us say, a two-state peace agreement.
On the Palestinian side, I think there is a large segment of the population that is also unconvinced and sees the alternatives to a two-state agreement - whether that would be a single multi-ethnic state or continuing in some form of armed resistance to Israel - as attractive and perhaps increasingly attractive. This is due in part to the failure of negotiations over the years.
One of the chief aims of the international community has to be to create an atmosphere in which both parties see an agreement leading to a two-state solution as the best most feasible option. However even if such an agreement was reached, this would merely be a milestone on the road to peace, rather than an end to the conflict. A Palestinian State cannot simply be declared with the stroke of a pen. It has to be built from the ground up, indeed as the Palestinians are trying to do. There is a document which I think was published in the last couple of days by the Office of the PA Prime Minister about priority interventions which the PA is seeking. It is a very sensible list of projects that they want to engage in to build a state. This work of building a state needs to be redoubled. It is a challenge for the international community to do this if we hope to secure the future of the Palestinian people.
Given these challenges, I would say that our traditional - that is the traditional US and European - approach to the conflict cannot succeed, whether it is novel proposals to resolve the core issues, or pressure on one party or another that fluctuates from time to time. A successful approach must focus on the fundamental causes of the conflict's persistence as well as on helping Palestinians to build a state that will survive past its Independence Day.
What should be done ? In my view, the US, Europe and our allies should organise our efforts along two broad lines of action. The first of these is countering those who oppose peace, chiefly Iran and its allies in Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah and other groups. I would recommend three goals. First disrupt the flow of arms, finance and other support from Tehran to these proxies or militant groups. These arms, such as the rockets which precipitated last year's Gaza war, provide militants with the capability to derail peace negotiations. If and when peace talks resume, tensions and violence are likely to increase rather than diminish because those who oppose them will want to put an end to them. This makes international interdiction efforts vital. As the technology available to these groups improves, especially with respect to the range and accuracy of light rockets, disrupting these networks will only increase in importance.
Our second goal, with apologies to my colleagues who hold a different view, should be to sharpen the diplomatic isolation of groups such as Hamas and to hold to account the states that sponsor Hamas. As long as these groups reject the legitimacy of Israel, eschew a peaceful resolution of the conflict and aim to undermine responsible Arab leaders, international and regional engagement with them can only harm the peace process.
This is not ideology. In my view, this is pragmatism. If given the choice between regressing twenty years by returning to the question of Israel's right to exist and Israel's recognition of whatever the group is on the other side, which is what Hamas wishes to do, or moving ahead with talks with those who are already committed to peace, I think we should choose the latter.
Finally, on this first prong, Israel, the Palestinian and Arab states should be encouraged to consider joint security arrangements for their mutual benefit. As the security landscape has changed in the Middle East over the last several decades, there has been a convergence in the threats that are perceived by these parties. Israel and the Arabs have long been mired in an apparent zero-sum game with an unmanageable trade-off between Israeli security and Palestinian sovereignty. Today's realities offer an opportunity for win-win security solutions.
While these three efforts that I have just described are necessary to ease the pressure on both Israel and the Palestinians, they are not sufficient for creating the right conditions under which progress can be made.
That leads me to the second prong of action, which I want to describe. That is to foster constituencies for peace in Israel, Palestine and the broader region. To this end I think we also should start with three actions. First the two-state vision should be reaffirmed by the international community as the only one which we will support. Israel and the Palestinians should be asked to reaffirm their commitment to this framework not merely in word but also in deed: for Israel, by ceasing the expansion of settlements; and for the Palestinians, by ending any incitement and challenges to Israel's legitimacy.
Second, other states in the region must step up their support for the peace process. To date those expressions of support and interest have not been matched by a commensurate level of material support. Budget support to the Palestinian authority must be increased. However efforts to dictate or constrain Palestinian negotiating positions should be ceased. Furthermore Arab states should reach out to Israel and eradicate the anti-Semitism which poisons the future of Arab-Israeli relations and is rife even in states like Egypt in the official media.
Finally greater attention and support must be given to Palestinian efforts to build institutions and spur economic growth. I think there has been progress in this in the last year. We have newly trained professional Palestinian security forces which are establishing some law and order in the West Bank. Salam Fayyad has put in place sensible plans for growth and development which deserve our support. Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu has to a great extent followed through on pledges to remove roadblocks - although Ms Shihabi disagrees with how extensive that has been - and improving movement and access in the West Bank. The IMF for its part has said that because of some of these changes, they predict 7 % growth in real GDP in the West Bank for 2009. It remains to be seen what the actual number will be, but this would be the first increase in living standards in the West Bank since 2005.
However, I do not think this should be seen as success. What has happened on the ground in the West Bank over the past year is merely a foundation for future success. Despite these advances in security reform, for example, complementary institutions such as courts and prisons remain underdeveloped. In fact, if you look at this new document that came out from the PA, they remain unfunded by the international community. Health and education systems are inadequate. Political party reform has only seen halting steps forward. The easing of closures of checkpoints is welcome, but it is not by any means sufficient. Significant barriers to Palestinian exports and foreign direct investment in the West Bank remain, as we saw from the Wataniya Telecom case, for those of you who are familiar with that.
To build upon some of the economic successes of the past year, both Israel and the Palestinians should be asked to commit to steps they can take together which may serve to rebuild trust and some momentum that could lead to future political negotiations, which I do not think are possible right now.
I think it is in areas such as this where Israeli and Palestinian interests converge or dovetail that confidence-building measures should be focused and could be effective. I think asking any party to make what they perceive, whether we agree or not, as premature concessions on the core issues is likely to fail and result in greater frustration and tension.
It is tempting but ultimately mistaken for we in the United States and Europe to focus exclusively on the core issues that have captivated diplomatic attention for so long. If we instead focus our efforts on the fundamental issues I have just talked about, it is likely the parties themselves can tackle those core issues with minimal outside assistance. There has been no shortage of creative ideas coming from both Israelis and Palestinians.
If, on the other hand, we neglect these fundamental issues and these obstacles to a sustainable peace, the chasm between the parties is likely to deepen and the mounting tensions and frustrations may once again erupt in violence. Thanks.
Henry SIEGMAN, Director of the U.S./Middle East Project and Former Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations - I must say at the outset that I regret that I am constrained by a text that I have prepared here and that I must stay reasonably within the ten minute limitations imposed on us. I would have much more enjoyed engaging with Mr Singh and discussing the content of his presentation.
I hope we will have a chance to discuss our differences afterwards. His proposals for confidence-building measures and for telling the Israelis that they should not be building settlements and should be freezing them all made good sense fifteen years ago. To hear them fifteen years later with the implication, that nothing has changed on the ground and that the confidence building is for a Palestinian State that, in fact, may no longer be possible, I find astonishing.
The first point I would like to make is that Israel's relentless drive to establish facts on the ground in the occupied West Bank has finally succeeded in establishing an irreversible situation. I think that is something that anyone who takes the trouble to go to the West Bank and see what has happened on the ground must realize.
If it is up to an Israeli government to modify significantly or undo this settlement or colonial project that it has in the West Bank, no Israeli government can ever again, in my view, do that. Indeed, it is impossible even for those who have pledged to take down minor hilltop outposts. They have not even been able to take down one of those. The expectation that they are going to be able to undo what have become cities all over the West Bank is utterly unrealistic. That is one of the transformed realities on the ground that I think most diplomats simply have not taken into account.
Of course, what also happens is that once this becomes irreversible, Israel crosses the threshold from being the only democracy in the Middle East to the only apartheid regime in the Middle East.
Some people get terribly upset when this is suggested. In fact, this point was made most forcefully by Israeli prime ministers, including Sharon. Olmert himself repeatedly warned that if Israel did not succeed in establishing a Palestinian State next to itself, then it would turn into an apartheid regime. Of course, when President Carter used that term, the roof fell in on him. When the Israeli Prime Minister used it, it was okay. Now it is widely recognised in most Israeli circles, but is denied by Israel's government. Settlements are so widespread and so deeply implanted in the West Bank as to rule out the possibility of their removal, as I indicated, by this or any other Israeli government except through outside intervention. Until now, for very good reasons, this was considered highly unlikely.
We need to bear in mind that the Jewish settlements and their supporting infrastructure are not a wild growth that just happened when people were not looking. They have been carefully planned, financed and protected by successive Israeli governments and Israel's military. Their purpose has been to retain Israeli control of Palestine from the river to the sea. This objective precludes, by definition, the existence of a viable and sovereign Palestinian State east of the pre-1967 border, which is presumably the objective of the Roadmap that all parties signed and obligated themselves to.
Already following the 1967 war, Moshe Dayan was asked: What will be the future of the occupied territories ? The answer he gave was that the future is maintaining the present. What is now must stay the way it is. Of course, it was a point of view that for those of you familiar with history was also endorsed by Israel's cabinet and by General Yigal Allon. He developed the security doctrine that mandated this kind of Israeli permanent presence in the territories. It became the central guiding security principle of Israeli governments, and shaped the current reality.
Prime Minister Netanyahu's conditions for Palestinian Statehood would leave most of the settlers in place and fragment the contiguity of the territory remaining for such a state. His conditions would also deny Palestinians even those parts of East Jerusalem that Israel unilaterally annexed immediately following the 1967 war. It is territory that is several times the historic area of Jerusalem. It was never previously part of Jerusalem.
In summary, Netanyahu's conditions for Palestinian Statehood would meet Dayan's goal of leaving Israel's de facto occupation permanently in place.
Given these realities, the problem is not how to improve diplomacy or to tinker with the mechanics of negotiations. It is how do you confront the fact that one of the parties has the overwhelming power and the ability to sustain its policy and to achieve its policy objectives while the other party is powerless? In other words, the question is how do you get Israel to do what it absolutely does not want to do?
Because of the presentation, that President Obama made in Cairo - the new language that he used, the new approach he had to American diplomacy, his promise to deal with the Israel-Palestine conflict in an even-handed way - all of this generated a worldwide expectation that he understands this is the real problem. The expectation was that the United States would say «enough» to Israel and draw on the vast credit accumulated by previous U.S. friendship and support for Israel to obtain compliance with the Roadmap and other international agreements. The expectation was that we now have an American president who will be as demanding of Israelis when they violate agreements as we have been of Palestinians.
Unfortunately, as we see from the recent statements by the President as reported in Time magazine, those expectations are being disappointed. This notion that we have endless time to go back to confidence building is an illusion. If the two-state solution has not already become impossible, one would have to move quickly to save it. Widespread anger over this disappointment may lead various parts of the international community, hopefully with Europe in the lead, to bring this issue back to the United Nations. Prime Minister Salam Fayyad's efforts to establish the institutions of statehood, if successful, should provide context for a Palestinian declaration of self-determination and statehood that the UN would accept. While the U.S. would not support such an initiative, it would find it difficult to prevent it. If such an initiative fails, then a one-state solution becomes inevitable.
Yves AUBIN de la MESSUZIÈRE, Former Director, North Africa/Middle East at the French Foreign Office, Former French Ambassador, President of La Mission laïque française (the French Lay Mission) - To add some further points to those already made, let me briefly analyze the Palestinian political context. The Palestinian movement is having to cope with an in-depth crisis of its political system. I would say that it is a crisis of confidence and a crisis of legitimacy at the same time.
The crisis of confidence is shown through recent initiatives taken by the various authorities of the Palestinian Authority. Unfortunately, sometimes this seems like just pushing ahead to no success. For example, the resort to UN, as mentioned earlier by Henry Siegman, to proactively get recognition of the future Palestinian state. This was immediately withdrawn. Also, you have statements that have been made on the Palestinian Authority dissolving itself. There is also some confusion regarding bringing things to the UN General Assembly on the Goldstone Report. Of course, there are also threats of resignation by Mr Abbas. We see the Palestinian Authority is at a loss during this crisis of confidence. They are subject to strong pressure to resume negotiations. I do not see very well how in the near future the Palestinian Authority and Mr Abbas would be able to resist pressure, particularly US pressure. We know that during his tour in Europe and elsewhere, Mr Mitchell has been asking partners to exert pressure on the Palestinian Authority without any real underlying vision.
We are familiar with crisis of legitimacy. For the Authority, this was worsened after Hamas' wins of elections in 2006. In January 2009, the Islamist Movement, which already rejected the legality of the Fayyad government as Ismail Haniyed felt he was the legal Prime Minister, declared illegal Mahmoud Abbas whose term came to an end. If we look at the image of the Palestinian Authority, we can also observe that is has deteriorated in public opinion. Sometimes it is perceived as an institution that is managing Palestinian territories on behalf of Israeli authorities. This is not criticism but analysis. Gradually the PLO and its main component, Fatah, seem to operate like some Arab regimes, as a government party which first and foremost wants to maintain power as opposed to actually reform the system.
We can also say it is a crisis of objectives in these constant negotiations since the Oslo Accords as though we have forgotten that the final objective was to create a Palestinian state on 22% of historical Palestine.
Now let us talk about Annapolis since Mr Singh alluded to this. I have written down what I observed. I feel this was an exercise that was abstract and disconnected from field reality. We saw this in the West Bank and in Gaza in the field. I would also say the process does not mention Jerusalem and refugees. There were negotiations and a couple of percentages were obtained regarding borders. Beyond that, I have not seen much progress made. We are talking about a new US strategy and I am afraid it will be the same situation again.
All in all, I think we can talk about backtracking. I do not know why people talk about the peace process. In Latin, the origin of process means progress or forward. Maybe we should reinvent this as «recess» or «retrocessive» process of peace. At any rate, it is backtracking. I am afraid what we are going to see once again is management of crisis or perhaps almost micromanagement of crisis as opposed to actually moving towards a resolution of the conflict.
I am not trying to paint a bleak, black picture. Let me say that I think Salam Fayyad's action has made it possible to make progress in cleaning up finances, public order, security and fighting corruption. This summer the Prime Minister presented a well-structured reform plan for gradually establishing institutions. The objective is to create the foundations for a future Palestinian state that would be proclaimed around 2011. I see this as a strategy of responsibility but I would also observe that there is probably no consensus within the Palestinian Authority. Among other things Abbas has not said this; this is a type of disconnect between the team in charge of negotiations and the Authority itself, which is managing the territories.
All in all, this is also paradoxical. We see a weakened authority from a political point of view and at the same time it is reformed or at least in the process of reform. There is clearly a problem of Palestinian leadership, which Israeli authorities do realise. They are very much responsible for the situation. The Israeli authorities can declare that they do not have or no longer have any partners for the peace process. The main problem that the National Palestinian Movement has to confront is its strong and lasting division. Since the breakthrough of the Hamas in Gaza 2007, a sanctioned autonomous entity has gradually been created. In spite of statements and conversations I have had in Gaza with Hamas officials, it is not their intention to create what is called «Hamastan».
Negotiations for inter-Palestinian reconciliation are in a deadlock. I see now through the various declarations that reconciliation of Palestinians is no more considered a prerequisite for the stabilization of the Palestinian territories and establishment of a favourable climate for resumption of negotiations.
Who is talking about Gaza? Gaza is no longer on the international community's radar screen. People are no longer talking about the necessary dialogue with the Islamist Movement that was recognised after the Gaza tragedy by a large proportion of the international community as a player or even an interlocutor. In the interim, people have become more reserved and fear that dialogue with the Islamist Movement would weaken the Palestinian Authority. Yesterday I saw a headline in « Le Monde » talking about prospects for dialogue with the Taliban. Maybe we need a few more years to see that type of headline regarding Hamas because whether you like it or not, it is a lasting reality. It is part of the Palestinian landscape. However, analysis and polls, which are efficient in the Palestinian territories, have shown that they do not have the majority in these territories.
Now let me mention Hamas strategy as I have seen it when I had contacts with the Islamist Movement in Gaza. The ideological change in Hamas took place in 2006 when they decided to take part in the elections process. This was an indirect way of recognising the Oslo Accords. Al-Qaeda realised this full well because the Hamas was severely criticised in several press releases of Al-Qaeda, including recently. There were several statements made recently by the political bureau of the movement in Damascus that refer to a Palestinian state within the borders of 1967, and to acceptance of a peace agreement negotiated by the Palestinian Authority provided it is approved by referendum. This was after Jimmy Carter's visit to Damascus. He obtained a paper that was published in the press. It was not widely seen. In Gaza, you do not have this type of statement I have mentioned. But from conversations and contacts we can deduce that they very much agree with the declaration made by the political bureau in Damascus.
Recently I saw the declaration by the Palestinian National Council (PNC) President Aziz Douik also talking about a Palestinian state within the borders of 1967 and going further as he said that the Hamas charter should be rescinded even if it does not have a status as the PLO charter had. This statement was refuted but, in my opinion, there is a recurrent trend here.
The pragmatic view is still in place in Gaza and I think Hamas has not really changed its strategy fundamentally. They are observing current diplomatic movements, convinced that they will fail so they do not need to try to act as an obstacle or impede them. In the same time, the positions are consolidating though. We see there is strong pressure exerted on Gaza society. We are wondering if there might not be reconciliation, if gradually Hamas may come back to its religious basics. Through the very lengthy talks I have had, for instance, with Mahmoud Zahar, the idea is that Islamist movements think in the long term. They are not in a hurry in the region. When the time comes, Islamist movements will take power. I do not think their strategy is one of trying to win over the PLO. Nevertheless, they say they want to belong to it as they represent 30 to 40%.
Let me make a few points regarding the Palestinian state as the issue is really the focus of the debate. Before going onto this, we have to push aside the idea of a two-nation state that some people allude to, which the PLO had been in favour of in the 1970s. That is utopian and also despairing from mostly the young generation. It is also a question of rhetoric. I do not know if you could confirm the Saeb Erekat talking about that option. How could you imagine this? Israel demands the Palestinian's recognition of the Jewish nature of their State.
There is another option, that is the devolution of the West Bank to Jordan and of Gaza to Egypt. It is mentioned even in foreign ministries. This is what I will call virtual diplomacy.
Often we hear people talking about the irreversible nature of the settlements and annexation of Jerusalem and, therefore, the impossibility of establishing a viable state. People say that what would have been possible if the Camp David negotiations had been successful is no longer possible due to the fragmentation of territories, the separation wall, Jerusalem encircled and the lasting dissidents in Gaza. I think that if we look at these situations, this is all reversible if there is a political will to do so. That is an international political will. This is one of the options alluded to in an article by Henry Siegman recently. Maybe the international community should stand in for parties. There are several ways of standing in for parties. The described situations are reversible because first of all there is broad consensus internationally in favour of a Palestinian state if it is a viable state with Jerusalem as its capital. We can only be glad though there were some reservations by the Palestinian Authority on the recent European declaration. I think that this will be part of the set of statements by the European Union, which comprises the Venice Declaration in 1980 about recognition and self-determination, the Berlin Declaration in 1999 about a viable Palestinian state. There were both French initiatives and Jean François-Poncet was one of the craftsmen of the declarations. Opinion is changing in Israel. A recent poll shows us that there is a broad Israeli majority in favour of a Palestinian state.
Furthermore, regarding the Fayyad plan, which was very well structured, I do not know if there is actual implementation. I saw via press analysis - Israeli, US and French press - that there was an American plan for two years. There is some convergence here. I wonder whether there might not have been some Palestinian-American consultations on this and regarding the timetable.
The main obstacle is obviously the Netanyahu government, which is the most right-winged government in Israel's history. We must underscore that the Prime Minister is a great tactician and he has become more popular than ever before. In little time, he has managed to reduce US pressure, which has now been placed on the Palestinian Authority and Abu Mazen.
Now Israel's political system also has a recurring leadership problem which prevents any government from really having a vision of peace and so prefering the status quo.
Briefly I will talk about recognition of a Palestinian state. As I see it, we should not go directly to the UN. There is a complex process involved. First of all, there has to be a request from the state to the UN Secretary General, which is handed onto the Security Council to get their approval. Then it is sent onto the General Assembly who will vote. At this juncture, there is always the possibility there of a US veto. There could be unilateral proclamation of a state if there was a deadlock. I think that is a possibility. It is a political act whether you recognise a state. For many European states and France there is no legal obstacle to this type of recognition, which was not the case in 1988 when the Palestinian National Council had proclaimed the Palestinian state. According to case law, there is a doctrine, which is the French position. According to the effectiveness principle even if a territory is not completely constituted, it can enter negotiations and discuss of borders based on the UN resolutions. There is the Palestinian Authority though it is limited. You have the three elements that constitute a Palestinian state. International practice tells us that for effectiveness to be established, you do not need to have the borders of the territory to be fixed once and for all.
In conclusion, unilateral proclamation of a Palestinian state by 2011 if negotiations do not succeed, which is, unfortunately, most likely may make it possible to trigger a movement - a political movement, not a violent movement. There may be a real new type of process, which would not be like the Oslo method. It would turn around perspective. Negotiations would follow the creation of the state. In this scenario, hopefully in advance, elections would take place. I am trying to put together a scenario for if there was unilateral proclamation. Maybe 140 or 150 countries would recognise the Palestinian State. I think 130 States that were part of the UN General Assembly had already recognised the Palestinian State although the pre-configuration of 1988 did not yet have all three elements. The scenario is all the more relevant since, in 2010 and 2011, there will probably not be any significant progress in terms of resumption of negotiations. If they do resume at best, there would be a process that I would call «Annapolis Plus», designed to manage a conflict that is considered to be a low intensity conflict. If none of these scenarios were to develop, we can say that as of now in the next two years, once again we will see an explosion of violence in Gaza, almost a war, and maybe we will see the emergence of a third Intifada. I apologise this seems so pessimistic but this is the same as the pessimism held by most analysts that we encounter regarding the Palestinian-Israeli conflict
Lastly we can regret that President Obama, in my opinion, has probably not changed his view as he has reaffirmed the centrality of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the arc of crisis from the Mediterranean to Afghanistan. I do not think he has changed his view but as we have seen very well, for instance, from the State of the Union address, there was not much mention of foreign policy and nothing about the Middle East. I hope this means that thought is underway and his strategy is being worked out. He would be well inspired to get in touch with Europeans on this since there is more and more convergence among Europeans and Americans. Nonetheless, we observe that they are all working on things separately. Thank you
Monique CERISIER-ben GUIGA, French Senator, Co-author of the Foreign Relations, Defence and Armed Forces Committee's Report on the Situation in the Middle East - Given that we are running late, I am not sure if maybe I can take just one question.
Participant - I want to talk about isolated negotiations. Where do we actually stand in that respect? Who is in charge in Hamas? Is it Ismail Haniyeh or Khaled Mashal?
Monique CERISIER-ben GUIGA, French Senator, Co-author of the Foreign Relations, Defence and Armed Forces Committee's Report on the Situation in the Middle East - Who can answer that one? The first part of the question may be for Ms Shihabi.
Yves AUBIN de la MESSUZIÈRE, Former Director, North Africa/Middle East at the French Foreign Office, Former French Ambassador, President of La Mission laïque française (the French Lay Mission) -What I have learnt is through the press alone but what strikes me is that there has not been any change. Negotiations concerning the exchange in two steps between Sharit and 1,000 prisoners under the allegiance of Egypt dragged on. The problem is that they are people with blood on their hands. Hamas made a choice. I am not absolutely sure but I believe Hamas are talking about the possibility of Barghouti. He is in prison and in contact with other prisoners. I know they have produced a common document one and a half years ago that some people consider as a reference. But I do not really know. It is said that the Germans could be mediators but if there are problems, it is probably on the Israeli side. There is the idea that many prisoners would go not to Gaza but elsewhere. It could be Egypt but it would obviously be seen as a huge Hamas victory. Remember the pictures we saw a couple of years ago when there was the exchange of corpses of Israeli soldiers against hundreds of Hezbollah prisoners. The main problem of Hamas is an image problem, especially in Gaza because they were not able to deal with the situation there so it is less popular. The strong pressure on the society to strengthen Islamism is a problem.
Who is actually in charge? I did not see any major divisions between the leadership in Gaza, who are the important ones as they are on the ground and up against the radicals, and the leadership in Damascus. They are in regular contact because the Hamas leaders in Gaza exit via Egypt and they meet often. Even if they have different approaches, I would say there is a certain amount of agreement. But open statements are made in Damascus and not in Gaza. They say it during discussions but they do not want to state it although they are dealing with the radical movements, the radical current in Hamas and even worse because there have been confrontations with Jihadists who are listening to what al-Qaeda is saying. Maybe they are not as important as some have suggested but they are still there so I do not really think there have been any major differences in the positions taken by Hamas.
Monique CERISIER-ben GUIGA, French Senator, Co-author of the Foreign Relations, Defence and Armed Forces Committee's Report on the Situation in the Middle East - We have to thank our speakers. Each provided very interesting, different input. We need to continue working and thinking. Thank you for being here this afternoon.