B. A PROJECT TO DEEPEN FRANCO-GERMAN COOPERATION
In addition to its role as a project for capability and operations, the FCAS is foremost a Franco-German political project desired by the French President and announced during the Franco-German Defence and Security Council on 13 July 2017.
The FCAS is an additional opportunity to strengthen and nurture the Franco-German partnership as part of the desire to revitalise this relationship, as was strongly manifested in the Aachen Treaty on 22 January 2019 . While the project now includes Spain and may be joined by other countries, it was first the product of France and Germany's efforts towards cooperation in recent years, particularly in terms of defence. By committing the two countries to a partnership likely to last more than 20 years (and even 50 years if we add the likely lifespan of the weapon systems), the FCAS programme assures very dense discussions throughout this period on a political and industrial level, as does the future MGCS combat tank project for land programmes.
1. The impetus created by the Aachen Treaty
More than half a century after the Elysée Treaty was signed as a sign of reconciliation (22 January 1963), the signature of the Treaty on Franco-German Cooperation and Integration by President Emmanuel Macron and Chancellor Angela Merkel on 22 January 2019 in Aachen confirmed the two countries' desire to deepen the Franco-German partnership.
In particular, chapter 2 of the treaty is entitled " Peace, Security and Development " and affirms the need to strengthen the Franco-German bilateral defence relationship with a view to creating a stronger Europe in the light of new international threats and turmoil (Brexit, terrorism, the rise of populism, the questioning of the multilateral order by world powers, etc.). This chapter also includes a mutual assistance clause based on Articles 5 (NATO) and 42.7 (EU). It also makes provision for the development of a joint strategic culture that seeks to strengthen Franco-German operational cooperation through joint deployments, which recalls the European Intervention Initiative (EI2) and confirms Germany's desire to play a more important role on the international scene.
Furthermore, in terms of capability and industrial cooperation, the two parties to this treaty commit to " [intensify] the development of common defence programmes and their expansion to include partners " (Article 4.3) and " [develop] a common approach " in terms of arms exports for these projects.
Finally, the Aachen Treaty reaffirms the role of the Franco-German Defence and Security Council (CFADS - Conseil franco-allemand de défense et de sécurité ) as a political body for steering these reciprocal commitments. Co-chaired by the French President and German Chancellor, the CFADS brings together the two countries' foreign and defence ministers and was last held formally on 13 July 2017 in Paris.
2. Perspectives for strengthening Franco-German operational cooperation to be confirmed
The FCAS project came about in a context of new perspectives of operational cooperation between France and Germany. The Aachen Treaty confirms much of the progress seen in recent years in this field. The desire to act jointly " whenever possible...with a view to maintaining peace and security. " (Article 4.2) shows a desire to reinforce the trend seen in recent years of German deployments in French zones of interest (the Sahel and the Levant). It also seems essential to work to capitalise on Germany's increased commitment to these theatres, particularly in the Sahel, where German support could be increased should some or all of the United States' capabilities be removed (air-to-air refuelling, tactical and strategic transport, intelligence).
Germany's participation in the European Intervention Initiative (EI2), launched by ten countries in June 2018 and which now counts 13 participating countries, 5 ( * ) could also help to bring together France and Germany's shared strategic cultures with a view to facilitating joint deployments of their military forces. EI2 has resulted in working groups created at the chief-of-staff level in the fields of strategic anticipation, scenario development and planning, operational support, and feedback and doctrine sharing.
France also announced that it was returning to Lithuania alongside Germany in 2020 as part of the advanced reinforced presence of NATO . France's participation translates to sending 300 soldiers, 4 Leclerc tanks and 13 armoured infantry fighting vehicles.
However, Germany's desire to be more involved on the international stage, which is explained in the 2016 white paper and in the 2018 coalition contract, has not yet had a major effect on Franco-German operational cooperation . The Franco-German brigade deployed in Mali (November 2018 - March 2019) saw German units join MINUSMA and EUTM Mali, while French soldiers were integrated into the Barkhane Force. Cooperation on joint engagement in hard fighting is not conceivable in the foreseeable future: Germany does not intend to take part in the Takuba Task Force and should limit itself to political support for the European Maritime Awareness in the Straits of Hormuz mission (EMASoH).
More generally, French initiatives do not always receive the desired reaction. Furthermore, the mission observed this during its visit to Berlin: concerning the Sahel, German members of parliament questioned the methods of the military intervention in Mali and regretted the lack of coordination between the various initiatives in support of the G5 Sahel. Nevertheless, Germany should involve itself more in the international Coalition for the Sahel by steering the pillar on " support for the return of the state and administrations ".
The gradual evolution of Germany's position on defence issues
1. Germany's traditionally prudent stance on defence and foreign relations
In its report in 2012 on the government bill to ratify the agreement on the Franco-German Brigade, our colleague Jean Marie Bockel underscored the tensions in defence matters between the two countries, particularly on the issue of the intervention in Libya (2011). Among the topics of discussion, he cited the disagreements within NATO, particularly on the role of nuclear dissuasion, disarmament and joint financing. He also discussed the conclusion of the Franco-British defence agreements in 2010 (the Lancaster House Treaties) which raised certain questions in Germany.
The report also highlighted that, due to the budget context, the time was hardly right for deepening Franco-German cooperation in defence. Germany was in the midst of a deep reform of its defence apparatus, with the end of conscription and the closure of a number of garrisons. In France, the defence apparatus underwent a significant transformation, with a reduction in personnel and a reform of support.
Finally, the Senate report underscored that, while Germany's military and political leaders had undertaken a study of the need for their country to play a more significant role on issues of defence and security and, even if the German army was engaged in several theatres such as Afghanistan, German public opinion was still reticent about foreign operations, particularly when these interventions were combat operations.
2. A move towards a more active stance after the Libya crisis
a) A gradual evolution of Germany's doctrine
After the abstention on the intervention in Libya (resolution 1973 of the United Nations Security Council in March 2011), the Merkel III government (2013-2018) began to study Germany taking on more responsibility on the international stage. During the 2014 Munich Security Conference, federal President J. Gauck, Defence Minister U. von der Leyen (CDU) and Foreign Minister F.-W. Steinmeier (SPD) affirmed in three speeches that Germany was ready to take on international responsibilities and make greater commitments. This call for more international involvement was called the "Munich consensus". Germany's strong involvement in Ukraine in 2014, particularly in the Normandy format, was a concrete reflection of this stronger commitment.
The study of this reorientation was also extended to the realm of defence. In the 2013 coalition contract, the government had already stated that the Bundeswehr was an "army in deployment" ( Militär im Einsatz ), which was a break with the tradition of restraint and the pacifist position of a large share of public opinion and certain parties. This approach was confirmed in the 2016 white paper. This change also came with a budgetary effort: ahead of the NATO summit in July 2018, the Chancellor promised to reach defence spending of 1.5% GDP in 2024. While NATO's target is still 2%, Mr Nikolaus Meyer-Landrut, Germany's ambassador in France, highlighted in his hearing before the committee that the German defence budget had already increased by 40% over the five preceding years.
b) Persistent reluctance and growing opposition to arms exports
The Bundeswehr remains a parliamentary army: approval from the Bundestag is a prerequisite to any foreign intervention. Furthermore, German parties and administrations are still very divided on these questions, even if public opinion is progressively moving towards greater approval of more significant foreign engagement. Germany is often criticised by civil society and certain political parties about its status as the world's 5 th largest arms exporter. The new coalition contract plans to prohibit delivering arms to countries directly engaged in the war in Yemen.
After the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi on 2 October 2018, Germany announced that it was suspending arms exports to Saudi Arabia. Foreign Minister Heiko Maas called for the international regulation of cruise missiles. While, the Chancellor called for the development of a " shared European culture in arms exports " in February 2019, the SPD opposed increasing exports in this domain and recommended prohibiting all exports to countries at war or crisis hotspots outside NATO. It also opposes any large increases to the defence budget.
c) Multiple German commitments in foreign theatres
Despite this continuing reluctance, the Bundeswehr now operates in multiple theatres of operation. After the 2014 decision to deliver arms to the Iraqi peshmergas in their fight against Islamic State, lifting the taboo on exporting arms to zones of conflict (to a non-state actor, no less), Berlin's support for French operations after the Paris attacks illustrates Germany's turnaround towards a more active foreign engagement.
Furthermore, shaken by the migration crisis and the risk of terrorism, Berlin has been more engaged in Africa in recent years, in particular in the Sahel (Mali: MINUSMA, EUTM Mali, EUCAP Sahel Niger - it stopped participating in operations in Somalia in early 2018, however), to support the G5 and its joint force.
d) A renewed commitment from Germany to multilateralism and for a reform of the United Nations Security Council
Germany is also seeking to strengthen its role within the United Nations, and Foreign Minister H. Maas agreed with Mr Le Drian to undertake an "Initiative in favour of multilateralism". Berlin is also showing a desire to increase Germany's voluntary contributions to the UN and to continue its engagement in peacekeeping operations.
Germany also wants to obtain a permanent seat on the Security Council, as well as for the other G4 members (Brazil, India and Japan). The coalition contract also sets out the more long-term objective of creating a permanent seat for the European Union. France is opposed to this. The Chancellor reiterated this proposal in June 2018, and Vice Chancellor O. Scholz even recently proposed (on 28 November 2018) transforming France's seat into an EU seat in the "medium term". However, the Auswärtiges Amt quickly distanced itself from this proposal, which has not been repeated since. But it resurfaces regularly, such as in the recent op-ed from CDU leader Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer published on 10 February in Die Welt am Sonntag.
3. A rebalancing of Germany's position towards the European defence policy?
When she returned from the G7 in Taormina (May 2017), the Chancellor stated that " we Europeans must really take our destiny into our own hands " because " the time when we could totally rely on others has, in part, passed ". Trade and defence issues were at the heart of bilateral difficulties between Germany and the United States in the summer of 2018. For Berlin, NATO and the American nuclear umbrella remain the pillars of German and European security (the "irreplaceable guarantor" according to the coalition contract). However, the German Chancellor now advocates maintaining a multilateral approach in the face of US unilateralism in security or trade matters. Vice Chancellor O. Scholz (SPD) has also come out in favour of a greater Europeanisation of the arms industry.
Source: the committee report from the Senate Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee on the Aachen Treaty.
3. Recent progress on Franco-German cooperation on capability
Since the implementation of the roadmap dedicated to monitoring the projects confirmed as part of the CFADS on 13 July 2017, Franco-German cooperation has seen significant progress in the domain of capability .
After signing letters of intent on the FCAS and the future tank (MGCS) at the Meseberg summit on 19 June 2018, the ministers specified how the leadership of these programmes would be distributed in Brussels on 19 November 2018: Germany will be the leader on MGCS and France on the FCAS .
Furthermore, the signature of a global EUROMALE contract is desired for the second half of 2020, subject to financial competitiveness. Finally, 2020 will also see the launch of feasibility studies for the Maritime Airborne Warfare System (MAWS) after a ministerial letter of intent was signed on 26 April 2018.
In general, France and Germany are seeking to leverage the potential offered by new European tools in capability (Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), the European Defence Fund (EDF)) by presenting many projects in the European framework (the MALE drone, the ESSOR software radio and the modernisation of the Tiger standard III).
* 5 Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, France, Finland, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Norway and Italy.