D. POLAND, A DIFFERENT SENSITIVITY TO COMMON CONCERNS
Your rapporteurs were eager to visit Poland, as this country is often cited in the context of the two preconceived analytical frameworks that as we have seen need to be transcended, namely those positing a contradistinction between the European Union and NATO on the one hand, and between the southern and eastern fronts on the other.
1. The interest of preserving the transatlantic bond
Your rapporteurs' Polish interviewees quite naturally emphasised the importance that Poland attaches to the protection offered by NATO, and therefore their interest in maintaining the best possible relationship with the United States at all costs. In this regard, to quote one of the people we spoke with during our visit, “Poland and the Eastern European countries in general face a real and immediate threat. But only the United States is able to provide a rapid response to that threat.”
Like other European countries, Poland is keenly aware of the US strategic pivot, although it draws different conclusions than France does. Where France concludes from the statements made by the US that Europe must prepare to be able to defend itself on its own one day, Poland is primarily concerned to keep any relative disengagement of the US from Europe from taking place, or at least delay it.
2. The beginnings of a strategic awakening?
It was apparent from the discussions your rapporteurs held both in Poland and in the broader NATO context that the Eastern border is not perceived as under threat from a Russian invasion of the European Union, but rather that Russia is constantly working to detach the United States from Europe and divide the European nations. It is therefore incorrect to depict the countries of Eastern Europe as expecting an impending Russian invasion, as certain analyses have done at times. The scenario that is anticipated, rather, is one of repeated and opportunistic attempts to destabilise European countries, especially those closest to Russia. For such purposes, the use of hybrid measures would seem likely to be preferred: cyber-attacks, misinformation, manipulations of political life and elections, espionage, etc.
At the same time, the Eastern European nations have pointed out that the use of force is still always on the table for Russia, as shown by a series of operations from the war of 2008 in Georgia to the Donbass, Crimea, and the recent incident in the Kerch Strait.
One of the interviewees put it quite pragmatically: “We know that the protection offered by the United States may not be unconditional or eternal. But Europe is not currently able to confront the threats to which it is exposed on its own. What we are dealing with here are real threats, not hypothetical ones. So we are forced to maintain the transatlantic bond.”
This is clearly not a rejection of European defence on principle, but rather a concern that mere preparations for a European defence will accelerate a withdrawal of the Americans before such a possible European defence has really become operational and efficient.
Two indications demonstrate this interest in principle for the reinforcement of European defence, although for the time being it is of course still seen only as a minority supplement to American protection: endorsement of the EDF and participation in PESCO. Admittedly, this support always comes with the caveat that such European developments must always be compatible with NATO and not deteriorate the transatlantic relationship. Poland's acceptance of membership in PESCO, furthermore, was accompanied by a letter specifying that its membership was contingent upon compatibility with NATO objectives.
For the time being, Poland is not yet strongly committed to PESCO. But at least it is not hostile to it, within the abovementioned limits.
3. Developing military cooperation with Poland
With an army of 123,000 men and a population of 38 million, Poland could be an important part of European defence. From this perspective, it would undoubtedly be very beneficial for both our countries to intensify our military relations, but also our dialogue on training activities. In this connection it would be a very positive development if young Polish officers could be sent to do part of their basic training activities in France, as is the case for the partnerships we have with Germany or the United Kingdom for example.